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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON DC 20330

REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

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19 OCT 1982

SUBJECT Revision of DCIDs (U)

TO Chairman
DCI Security Committee

1. (U) Your memorandum (SECOM-D-326), 27 Sep 82, same subject, tasked the Compartmentation Subcommittee with reviewing and revising DCIDs 1/7 and 1/20 by 5 Nov 82.

2. (U) The Compartmentation Subcommittee has concluded its task and unanimously approved the attached draft revisions of the two DCIDs.

a. (U) DCID 1/7 Revision. Except as follows, the attached primarily reflects format and editorial revisions made necessary by recent NFIB policy on the restructuring of DCID directives and related policy statements.

(1) (U) The phrase "and related material" was added after the word "intelligence" in the last sentence of paragraph 6f. This change was suggested by the NSA member to broaden the application of the "REL _____" control marking.

(2) (U) Paragraph 4 was added to the Appendix at the request of the Air Force member to implement NFIC-30.1/6, 16 Aug 82, concerning policy on contractor operation of all-source telecommunications centers.

b. (U) DCID 1/20 Revision. This revision also primarily reflects format and editorial revisions. Exceptions are as follows:

(1) (U) The NSA member noted that the current DCID 1/20 provides that unofficial travel to the hazardous areas without official approval may result in the withdrawal of continued SCI access approval only for persons with specific and extensive knowledge. The members agreed that this sanction should be applied to all SCI-indoctrinated persons--not just those with extensive knowledge--and included wording to this effect in paragraph 3b.

(2) (C) The appendix was amended to provide that "any form of transportation facilities owned or controlled by an activity within a listed country" be considered a hazardous


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activity. This was proposed by the Air Force member in view of the known hazards associated with using such facilities, e.g., traveling aboard the Soviet "Odessa" type "cruise ships."

3. (U) The Compartmentation Subcommittee recommends that the DCI SECDEF endorse the attached revisions of DCID 1/7 and DCID 1/20 and forward them to the NFIB for further consideration.


GEORGE J. MERCURIO, Colonel, USAF
Chairman, Compartmentation Subcommittee
DCI Security Committee

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1. DCID 1/7 Revision (U)
2. DCID 1/20 Revision (C)

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